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Abstract
Purpose – The relationships between tourist resorts and transnational crime are rarely analyzed

systematically. This paper begins to ﬁll this gap by examining how organized crime groups and individuals
linked to them can take advantage of tourist resorts to commit crimes.
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1. Introduction
Organized crime groups (OCGs) and individuals related to them involved in transnational
crime often take advantage of tourist resorts and the embedded tourist industry to pursue
criminal goals (Savona and Riccardi, 2015, p. 202; 2017, p. 11; 2018, p. 57). Yet, the
relationship between tourist resorts and transnational organized crime has not been
analyzed adequately. This paper begins to address this analytical gap by providing a
detailed conceptual framework for how organized criminal groups and individuals
connected with them can exploit tourism areas and the tourist industry to further criminal
ventures and elude law enforcement.
The proposed conceptual framework focuses on the case of the Mexican tourist resorts of
Cancún and Playa del Carmen in the so-called Mayan Riviera. Cancún is the most visited
city in Latin America (Euromonitor International, 2019) and was the second city in the
world’s most dependent on tourism after Macau (World Travel and Tourism Council
[WTTC], 2019) before the global COVID-19 pandemic hit tourism-dependent destinations.
Considering that the Mayan Riviera has become home of expatriate communities involved in
the tourism industry, this paper explores in particular the case of individuals of Italian
origin tied to transnational crime who have relocated to Cancún and Playa del Carmen since
the late 1990s. Additionally, based on open source information, this paper provides the ﬁrst
systematic review of the presence of transnational fugitives in the Mayan Riviera.
Historically, border areas, seaports, airports, free trade zones and other transportation
hubs created to foster legal economies have been targeted by OCGs seeking to further
criminal goals (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2016,
p.137; United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010). Seaports, for example,
have been identiﬁed as primary venues exploited by OCGs to smuggle contraband such as
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drugs (Sergi, 2020, p. 28). Given the high inﬂux of cargo and people, seaports face inherent
difﬁculties of performing adequate controls (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and
Drugs Addiction [EMCDDA] [1], 2019) without undermining efﬁciency and economic
functionality (World Customs Organization, 2019).
Mass tourism areas provide many of the same opportunities for organized criminal
groups. Analyzing tourist resorts as physical and functional spaces exploitable by
transnational OCGs for criminal purposes is all the more signiﬁcant, given that tourism is
one of the largest economic sectors globally (United Nations World Tourism Organization
[UNWTO], 2006, 2020). In 2019, the tourism economy generated US$8.9tn and represented
10.3% of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP), according to the WTTC. Besides
contributing consistently to several countries’ GDP, thanks to tourist spending and general
business investment in the sector, the physical movement of tourists around the world has
grown massively, facilitated by less protective visa regimes and cheaper airfares (United
Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2010). The UNWTO (2006, 2020) estimates
that in 1970 there were 165.8 million international tourist arrivals, while in 2019 they
reached 1.5 billion. The massive cross-border movement of tourists and the growth of the
tourism economy have provided criminals with increased mobility and have allowed new
opportunities for criminal enterprises (Shelley, 2011). At the same time, the expansion of the
tourism economy has facilitated hiding proﬁts of illicit origin by investing in the tourism
industry (Savona and Riccardi, 2015, p. 202; 2017, p. 11; 2018, p. 57).
Yet, surprisingly, research is lacking into systemic analysis of how mass tourist resorts
with a high inﬂux of international tourists are exploited by transnational OCGs. Around
the world, there are examples of individuals linked to transnational OCGs exploiting
international tourist resorts to perpetrate criminal activities. These include, among others,
Italian and Russian maﬁa-type OCGs and Bulgarian OCGs in tourist areas such as the
Cote d’Azur in Southern France (Allen, 2010), the Black Sea coast in Bulgaria (Ghodsee,
2005, p. 9) and Punta del Este in Uruguay (El País, 2016; Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2019).
Academic literature provides some notable evidence of the interactions between Camorra
Italian maﬁa-type OCGs and the tourist industry in Spain (Allum, 2016, pp. 20–26),
underscoring the vulnerability of the tourist sector to inﬁltration by Italian maﬁa-type
OCGs across Europe (Antimaﬁa Investigation Directorate Rome [DIA], 2018a, p. 199;
2018 b, p. 88; 2019a, p. 271; 2019b, p. 215).
On the other hand, governments have focused their attention primarily on the safety of
tourists in tourism areas. Unsurprisingly, scholar analyses of the relationship between crime
and tourism have mostly centered on predatory and opportunistic crimes (Altindag, 2014;
Mawby, 2014; Pizam, 1982; Ryan, 1993) against tourists or on potential terrorist attacks in
tourist resorts (Feridun, 2011; Fleischer and Buccola, 2002; Ryan, 1993; Smyth et al., 2009)
seeking to generate “social alarm.” Additionally, analyses of the relation between tourist
areas and predatory crime tend to focus on identifying crime hotspots (Crotts, 1996) where
tourists tend to be particularly vulnerable, such as bars and nightclubs, and the embedded
victimization of tourists (Ryan and Kinder, 1996; Schiebler et al., 1996).
Nevertheless, Lemiuex and Felson (2011) have highlighted how tourism is “especially
interesting” in relation to transnational crime. Additionally, Ryan (1993) has stressed that
tourist locations are expressly used as “venues for crime.” While mainly focusing on
predatory crimes and terrorism, Ryan argues that, just like big cities, “mass tourist
destinations possess in themselves characteristics that aid criminal activity.” He shows how
the tourist industry can serve as a front for criminal ventures while allowing criminals to
remain inconspicuous. At the same time, tourist resorts feature plentiful “offender
convergence settings” (Felson, 2006), such as bars, hotels, nightclubs, that can be functional
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to set the stage for crime by assembling accomplices and getting illicit processes started.
Illicit transactions might occur in these settings or might occur later elsewhere. Drawing
from available academic literature (Lemieux and Felson, 2011; Ryan, 1993), this paper
suggests that mass tourist resorts have four main characteristics that facilitate
transnational crime operations and networking.
The ﬁrst characteristic is the high turnover of national and international tourists, as well
as that of seasonal workers, entrepreneurs investing in the tourist business and established
expatriate communities.
The ﬁrst characteristic facilitates a second one, namely, the high level of anonymity
travelers enjoy in mass tourism areas. Strangers do not stand out, and thus local authorities
and residents have a reduced capacity to identify suspicious individuals and activities and
alert law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Fugitives from justice can easily pose as tourists or
tourist sector entrepreneurs.
The third characteristic involves the high volume of economic transactions stemming
from tourists’ tendency of unrestrained spending habits, together with high ﬂows of
investment and proﬁts in the tourist industry sector. High economic ﬂows overall contribute
to make circulation of cash and foreign currencies unexceptional and hide illicit money.
Additionally, real estate investments in the tourism sector – in venues such as bars,
restaurants and hotels – provides an additional opportunity to exploit them as fronts for
perpetrating crimes (Ryan, 1993) and laundering illicit proﬁts onshore.
Finally, the fourth characteristic involves the tendency of mass tourist resorts that are
highly dependent on tourism to hide or deny crimes for fear of discouraging tourists, as noted
by Lemiuex and Felson (2011). In fact, to reap tourism revenues, governments tend to
provide extensive security assets to limit visible predatory crimes in tourist resorts.
Ironically, the presence of law enforcement units on the street does not discourage the type
of criminal ventures described in this paper. Instead, it may contribute to a sense of security
for OCGs’ representatives to hide while fugitives.
In addition to these four characteristics, it is important to highlight that some mass
tourist resorts possess an additional characteristic that can facilitate transnational crime
activities and criminal networking stemming from their geostrategic location. This is evident
in the case of Spanish tourist resorts such as the Costa del Sol – centered in the coastal city of
Malaga – and the island of Tenerife, part of the Canary Islands archipelago. Spain is a
wholesale drug market, as it is the entry and transit point for hashish from North Africa and
cocaine from South America destined for other European drug markets (EMCDDA, 2019).
For example, in 1986, Nunzio De Falco, an individual linked to the Casalesi clan of the
Camorra Italian maﬁa-type OCG, moved while still a fugitive to the Costa del Sol where he
had contacts and orchestrated the importation of cocaine into Italy (Allum, 2016, p. 148). De
Falco laundered the illicit proﬁts by opening pizzerias, restaurants, hotels and factories and
expanded to the larger cities of Seville and Barcelona. In a more recent example, police
dismantled a large-scale cocaine trafﬁcking network involving Colombian, Peruvian and
Spanish nationals in the island of Tenerife in January 2020 (European Union Agency for
Law Enforcement Cooperation [Europol], 2020). The network distributed cocaine delivered
in bulk from Colombia, concealing it in caravans that traveled along the routes of Tenerife’s
tourist camping sites (Europol, 2020). These two examples show how the geostrategic
location of certain mass tourist resorts can be an additional incentive for conducting
transnational crime operations.
This study takes these initial conceptualizations further. It argues that mass tourist
resorts provide transnational OCGs with highly networked logistical and ﬁnancial
interconnected structures. Taking into account the four characteristics cited above – along

with the geostrategic location of certain resorts – this study argues that transnational OCGs
and OCG-linked individuals can exploit mass tourist areas in three main ways:
(1) as platforms to broker and oversee criminal deals and operations, such as drug
trafﬁcking;
(2) as areas to launder illicit proﬁts derived from criminal activities onshore; and
(3) as places to hide while fugitives to elude law enforcement authorities.
On a methodological note, rather than focusing on criminal organizations as a whole, this
paper focuses on the “individual dimension,” one of the most overlooked topics in organized
crime studies – if compared to terrorism studies – as underscored by von Lampe (2009).
Despite recognizing the intrinsic limits of case-based studies, this paper argues that the
analysis of individuals and their relationship with speciﬁc settings is a good ﬁrst step to
understand overall dynamics between transnational OCGs and tourist resorts. Moreover,
this paper has found that a case-based approach is not only helpful but also incumbent, at
least at the time when this paper was written. The main reason is the lack of access to
classiﬁed law enforcement information detailing the presence and operations of
transnational OCGs in speciﬁc tourist locations over time. By focusing on the “individual
dimension” of transnational organized crime, this paper seeks to present an initial
exploration of a phenomenon and by no means intends to be exhaustive. Yet, this paper
provides a conceptual framework that could help understanding the relationship between
transnational crime and tourist resorts in other regions or countries of the world.
This paper examines these dynamics in one of the busiest tourist areas in the world: the
resorts of Cancún and Playa del Carmen in the so-called Mayan Riviera area in the
southeastern Mexican state of Quintana Roo. Nestled between the Caribbean Sea and
bordering Belize, Quintana Roo’s economy is heavily based on tourism and real estate. The
majority of the state’s economic activity is concentrated in the municipalities where Cancún
and Playa del Carmen are located (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía [INEGI],
2017). Relevantly, Quintana Roo is a strategic location within a decades-old cocaine
trafﬁcking route (Bagley, 2012; Stratfor, 2006). The state is part of a drug trafﬁcking route
originating mainly in South America and one of the main gateways to the US criminal
market (United Nations Ofﬁce on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2019; US Department of
Justice [DOJ] Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], 2017, 2019). In particular, Cancún is
the most visited city in Latin America and ranks second in the world in terms of dependence
on tourism, accounting for 46.8% of Cancún’s GDP in 2018 (Euromonitor International,
2019; WTTC, 2019). Playa del Carmen, 69 kilometers (43 miles) south of Cancún, has been
gradually transformed since the 1980s from a small ﬁshing village to a global tourist
destination (Donato, 2014, Location No. 556–1080). In 2019, the world’s largest travel website
rated Playa del Carmen (the only Mexican destination on the list) as the 17th top travel
destination worldwide, ahead of Lisbon and just behind Tokyo (TripAdvisor, 2019).
The Mayan Riviera is also home to an established international community (e.g.
entrepreneurs, retired expatriates) including an estimated 16,000 Italian nationals residing
in the area mostly concentrated in Playa del Carmen (Barzizza, 2019; Novedades Quintana
Roo, 2016) [2]. As in other tourist resorts around the world, criminal elements have
unsurprisingly been detected among the several expatriate communities in the Mayan
Riviera. Indeed, open source data shows how individuals of Italian origin with links to
transnational criminal networks have relocated to Cancún and Playa del Carmen since the
late 1990s, getting involved in drug trafﬁcking and laundering networks while time posing
as legitimate entrepreneurs in the tourist sector in the area. Of course, Italian origin
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individuals are not the only international criminals present in Quintana Roo. In 2019,
Mexican authorities assessed that criminal cells with ties to ten transnational OCGs
including groups of Romanian, Israeli and Cuban origin (El Financiero, 2019; Organized
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project [OCCRP], 2020) operate in Cancún and Playa del
Carmen. Because of limitations on the scope of this paper, the empirical analysis focuses
principally on Italians with links to OCGs operating in the Mayan Riviera.
This study is structured as follows: it begins by providing a general overview of the
tourism industry in the Mayan Riviera. Then, the study delves into how individuals with
links to transnational OCG’s have used the Mayan Riviera as a place to oversee and
orchestrate criminal activities such as drug trafﬁcking. It details the emblematic case of
Italian fugitive Oreste Pagano, a key ﬁgure in cocaine trafﬁcking between South America,
North America and Italy who relocated to the area in the late 1990s. Thanks to established
criminal contacts with local players in the Mayan Riviera, Pagano got involved in Cancún’s
real estate industry. The following section highlights the vulnerabilities making the
Mexican tourist sector particularly susceptible to money laundering by focusing on the case
of Vincent Salzano, an Italian-born US entrepreneur with a drug-related criminal record who
relocated to Playa del Carmen. Next, the study examines how international fugitives,
including some with links to transnational OCGs, have found in the Mayan Riviera a
favorable environment to camouﬂage their presence. Drawing from a universe of 34
international fugitives since at least 1997, the study focuses on the case of Italian fugitive
Ivan Fornari, arrested in Playa del Carmen in 2017. Lastly, this study presents some
conclusions.
2. Tourism in Mexico’s Caribbean Coast: the rise of Cancún and Playa del
Carmen
This section provides a general view of how Cancún and Playa del Carmen rose to become
two of the most popular international tourist resorts. The tourism industry is one of
Mexico’s three main sources of foreign income, along with merchandise exports and migrant
workers remittances. The tourism sector’s relevance cannot be underrated, with Mexico
being the world’s 15th largest economy (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2018) and the
world’s seventh largest tourist destination by international arrivals, ahead of Germany and
just behind Turkey (UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), 2019]. Tourism represents
8.7% of Mexico’s total GDP amounting to US$67.7bn in 2018, according to INEGI (2019).
The Mexican Caribbean state of Quintana Roo plays a prominent role in Mexico’s tourism
sector, accounting for almost half (47.5%) of the country’s international arrivals OECD,
2017]. Within Quintana Roo, the coastal resort towns of Cancún and Playa del Carmen are
the main hubs attracting domestic and international visitors. Located in the northern section
of the state, Cancún and Playa del Carmen are part of Mexico’s larger Yucatan Peninsula
and are just ﬁve hours away from the international border with Belize. Covering an area the
size of Switzerland, Quintana Roo’s economy is mostly based on the tourism and real estate
sectors, which account for 22.4% and 13% of the state’s GDP, respectively – MXN
$224,000m pesos (2008 price) in 2015 (INEGI, 2017).
Cancún, located in the Benito Juarez municipality, was founded in the early 1970s, on a
deserted coastline, underdeveloped and barely populated (Pelas, 2011). The birth of Cancún
was the result of a state-directed tourism development strategy planned and put into action
by the Mexican Government through the Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo
(FONATUR). In 1970, the state of Quintana Roo had a total population of 88,000 (INEGI,
2017; Pelas, 2011). Within a political system of one-party authoritarian rule, the Mexican
Government saw in tourism an opportunity to stimulate economic development in a region

with great poverty and no industry. Moreover, the Mexican Government investment in the
tourist industry in Quintana Roo may have also reﬂected geostrategic considerations.
Tourism in the Yucatan Peninsula may have represented a way to deﬂect the threat of the
Left and of a potential indigenous uprising in the area bordering a politically troubled
Central America (Pelas, 2011).
Thanks to national and international investments, Cancún quickly became the “crown
jewel” of the Mexican tourist sector, featuring ﬁve-star hotels, renowned nightlife, allinclusive vacation offers, an international airport and close proximity to famous
archeological sites of the Yucatan Peninsula. White sands, turquoise ocean waters and an
average yearly temperature of 27 degrees Celsius (80 Fahrenheit) represent a unique setting
attracting tourists year-round from all over the world. Cancún’s tourism industry, with its
demand for non-specialized labor, has become a job magnet for people from other areas of
Mexico. Today, Cancún has expanded its population to almost 750,000 (INEGI, 2017). One of
the world’s most important tourist hubs and the most visited city in Latin America, the city
recorded 6.2 million visitors in 2018 (Euromonitor International, 2019). In 2019, Cancún’s
international airport – Mexico’s busiest airport in terms of the number of international
passengers [Gobierno de México, Secretaría de Gobernacion (SEGOB), 2021] – received 7.8
million international passengers. Over time, the growing development of the tourism
industry has transformed the once poor and almost deserted state of Quintana Roo into a
tourist mecca that can offer “a little bit of everything” for all budgets (Pelas, 2011), thanks to
a wide selection of accommodation facilities and inexpensive all-inclusive hotels.
Just 69 kilometers (43 miles) south of Cancún, the small ﬁshing village of Playa del
Carmen, located in the municipality of Solidaridad, was transformed during the 1980s into
an international tourist town due to its location as a convenient jumping off point to two
other premier tourist sites: the island of Cozumel and the Mayan archeological site of Tulúm.
The tourist development of Playa del Carmen was more gradual than that of Cancún, at least
in the early stages, attracting mostly Italian and German tourists (Donato, 2014, Location
No. 556–557; Camacho Lomelí, 2015). Over time, Playa del Carmen was transformed from a
rustic tourist resort into a top international destination, attracting international visitors and
investments (Camacho Lomelí, 2015; Donato, 2014, Location No. 1038 –1039). Today, Playa
del Carmen has a population of over 200,000 (INEGI, 2017) including a sizeable community
of international retirees and entrepreneurs. Quintana Roo as a whole features signiﬁcant
expatriate communities of Americans, Canadians, and Europeans totaling 24,000 in 2015,
1.6% of the state’s 1.5 million inhabitants (INEGI, 2015, 2017; Rodríguez Chavez and Cobo,
2012). It is reasonable to believe this is an underestimate since many foreigners do not
formally register or only reside there for part of the year. Foreign-born populations in
Quintana Roo are mostly concentrated in Cancún and Playa del Carmen.
Among these foreign expatriates, Italian entrepreneurs were among the ﬁrst foreign
residents arriving in the former ﬁshing village of Playa del Carmen and quickly became an
integral part of the resort development in the area. The number of Italian residents living in
Playa del Carmen has grown from 36 in 1996 to between 7,000 and 10,000 in 2014 (Donato,
2014, Location No. 1042). In all of Quintana Roo, the Italian community is estimated to be
approximately 16,000, according to a consular statement reported by local media
(Novedades Quintana Roo, 2016). Nowadays, Italians are an inﬂuential component of Playa
del Carmen’s society (Donato, 2014, Location No. 1046) with some aspects of the Italian
culture even becoming local traditions. Some of the most evident signs of inﬂuence of Italian
culture are the creation of the Ferragosto Festival, inspired by Italy’s Ferragosto holiday of
August 15 to celebrate the height of summer, and the Mayan Riviera Italian Festival.
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During the past three decades, the members of the Italian community have become
deeply involved in Playa del Carmen’s tourism industry (Donato, 2014, Location No. 1052;
Novedades Quintana Roo, 2016). Ofﬁcial statistics show that in Quintana Roo there are 375
companies with Italian capital concentrated mostly in Playa del Carmen, Cancún and the
smaller resort of Tulúm (Mexico’s National Registry of Foreign Investment, consulted via
Dateas, 2020). A total of 64% of these Italian capital companies (240) are based in Playa del
Carmen. A substantial number of these companies in Quintana Roo (73) are devoted to
temporary accommodation and food preparation services (i.e. hotels, restaurant, bars,
cafeterias, nightclubs), while 94 are involved in the real estate sector. The other sectors
involving Italian investments are active in the following sectors: wholesale, retail,
construction, sporting, recreation and cultural services. The vast majority of the companies
with Italian capital are listed as limited liability companies (LLCs, Sociedad Anonima de
Capital Variable [S.A. de C.V.]), a common and widespread registration type in Mexico.
However, as underscored by the latest IMF’s country report (Mexico: Detailed Assessment
Report – Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2018) this
type of company lends itself to use by money laundering schemes. Creating such companies
in Mexico involves minimal requirements (two shareholders) and leaves the door open for
other people to act as straw men. Moreover, such companies may often “even be registered
in the name of the criminal, but the name may still remain hidden from the general public
due to the deﬁciencies in the company ownership register” (IMF, 2018).
3. Cancún as a platform for transnational crime: the case of Oreste Pagano
This section explores how individual criminals with ties to transnational OCGs have taken
advantage of a world-class resort-like Cancún as a platform to oversee and orchestrate
criminal activities, in particular drug trafﬁcking. The rise of Cancún as a tourism mecca
coincided with changes in the international cocaine trafﬁcking business, making it attractive
for criminal elements to settle there since at least the 1990s. After the US Government
implemented interdiction efforts in the 1980s that effectively closed off Florida as a
major entry point for Colombian cocaine, (Bagley, 2012; Stratfor, 2006) Mexico became
an attractive transshipment point for Colombian OCGs. The country’s 3,200-kilometer
(2,000-mile) land border with the USA and its lightly patrolled Paciﬁc and Atlantic
coastlines facilitated drug smuggling. In the mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s, Colombian
OCGs developed new cocaine trafﬁcking routes transiting Central America and the Paciﬁc
Ocean into Mexico (Stratfor, 2006). The ﬂows of cocaine through Mexico profoundly
changed the drug trafﬁcking landscape in the Americas and signiﬁcantly increased the
power of Mexican OCGs (Perry Center, 2014). Among the new drug trafﬁcking groups there
was the Juarez Cartel, whose home base was the manufacturing hub of Ciudad Juarez on the
USA–Mexico border.
With the growth of the area’s tourism industry in the 1990s, Quintana Roo’s coastline in
southeastern Mexico became a target for cocaine transshipment from South America.
Throughout the decade, Mexican OCGs used downtown warehouse facilities in Cancún to
store cocaine (Sheridan, 1998). In close proximity to the resort, small boats raced to big ships
or low ﬂying planes to pick up bundles of cocaine. Around the same time, drug trafﬁckers
used the nearby island of Cozumel (today a major pier for cruise boats along the Caribbean)
and the smaller seaside resort of Tulúm in similar ways. Mexican and US authorities
estimated that each month OCGs moved about 15 tons of Colombian cocaine through
Quintana Roo’s “cocaine coastline” (Sheridan, 1998).
A lightly patrolled coast with geographical proximity to Central and South America was not
the only feature attracting Mexican OCGs to Cancún in the 1990s. As a US counter-narcotics

ofﬁcial explained in 1998 (Sheridan, 1998), they were also taking advantage of the anonymity
offered by Cancún’s highly dynamic tourism industry. Due to Cancún’s increasingly high
turnover of visitors, individuals tied to Mexican OCGs could gain anonymity and evade law
enforcement authorities by posing as tourists or businessmen. They could also hold meetings
and organize criminal activities from the privacy and comfort of high-end hotels serving as
“offender convergence settings” (Felson, 2006), while US law enforcement efforts were
preoccupied elsewhere at its own the Southwest border, including Ciudad Juarez (Sheridan,
1998). In less than 30 years since its birth, Cancún had given rise to opportunities for legitimate
entrepreneurs but also for criminal actors as a platform for networking and to oversee illegal
activities including drug trafﬁcking and laundering operations.
The case of Mexican drug trafﬁcker Alcides Ramon Magaña is emblematic of how the
Juarez Cartel exploited Cancún as a platform to oversee and orchestrate its drug trafﬁcking
operations. In the 1990s, the Juarez Cartel leadership commissioned Magaña and another
high-ranking drug trafﬁcking operative, Albino Quintero Meraz, to run the Quintana Roo
“plaza” (turf), as reported by Reforma newspaper (Carrillo, 2000). By 1996, Magaña and
Quintero Meraz controlled the entry of multiple tons of cocaine from Colombia into Mexican
territory through the Cancún area (Carrillo, 2000). Well-established within the community,
Magaña lived in a Cancún house known as El Quijote, located in the prestigious
Supermanzana 18 neighborhood of the city. Eating at Cancún’s best restaurants, he related
to people “as if he were a businessman,” periodically booking a room at the high-end Ritz
Carlton Hotel (Carrillo, 2000). There, he would arrive in luxurious cars with dark windows
escorted by armed men who would organize the check-in and carry briefcases for him. As
the briefcases were taken to the room, Magaña would be ushered quickly from the car to his
room. Ultimately, he was arrested for drug trafﬁcking and money laundering in 2001.
Crucially, the Juarez Cartel beneﬁted from the cooperation of high-level Mexican ofﬁcials
in Quintana Roo. The corrupt collaboration went so far that Quintana Roo authorities even
provided the Cartel’s operatives, such as Magaña, with protection for his movements in the
state. The collusion reached even Quintana Roo’s governor between 1993 and 1999, Mario
Villanueva Madrid. After his six-year term ended, Villanueva Madrid was indicted for drug
trafﬁcking. He was arrested in 2001 after two years on the lam and extradited to the USA.
After pleading guilty in a federal court in New York, Villanueva Madrid was sentenced in
2013 to 11-year imprisonment “for conspiring to launder millions of dollars in narcotic bribe
payments that he received from the Juarez Cartel” (DOJ, 2013). To this date, Villanueva
Madrid’s case remains one of the most egregious examples of high-ranking ofﬁcial
corruption in Mexico. In sum, the 1990s saw Quintana Roo’s geostrategic location gain in
relevance for transnational criminal operations given its rise as a key point in an
international drug trafﬁcking route.
The arrival of foreign individuals with links to transnational OCGs in the Mayan Riviera
happened as the Mexican Caribbean cocaine trafﬁcking route grew in prominence and the
Mexican drug trafﬁcking organizations raised their proﬁle. In fact, Cancún’s rise as a
cocaine trafﬁcking hub did not escape the attention of criminal networks abroad. Among
them was the Italian drug trafﬁcker Oreste Pagano, with a past linked to the Neapolitan
New Camorra Organization (NCO). A fugitive from Italian justice and largely overlooked in
academic literature, Pagano can be considered a pioneer ﬁgure in the international drug
trade business and who reinvented himself in the Americas as one of the ﬁrst modern
“brokers” for transnational criminal networks, arranging the movement of cocaine by the
ton to North America and Europe, particularly for the Caruana-Contrera, an ItalianCanadian maﬁa-type OCG of Sicilian origin. The Caruana-Contrera was a family-based OCG
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that left Sicily between 1950 and 1960 and relocated in North and South America, mostly in
Canada and Venezuela (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, pp. 111– 112).
The NCO was founded by the Camorra leader Raffaele Cutolo from within prison in the
late 1970s (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 113). In the 1970’s, Cutolo had Pagano relocate to
Soiano del Garda – a tourist resort on the Garda Lake in the province of Brescia in Northern
Italy – to manage the NCO leader’s lake villa and help orchestrate NCO’s criminal ventures
such as drug trafﬁcking, extortion and loan sharking (Vallini, 1998; Lamothe and Nicaso,
2001, p. 113; Osservatorio sulla Criminalità Organizzata [Cross], 2018, pp. 199-200). Pagano
also contributed to the creation of the ﬁrst “real [NCO Camorra] enclave” (Cross, 2018; p. 199)
outside Southern Italy. In the villa, Pagano sheltered Cutolo after the NCO leader escaped
from prison in 1977 (Cross, 2018, p. 199). His years in the tourist area of Lake Garda
informed Pagano’s criminal efforts in Cancún 20 years later. Pagano and Cutolo also
laundered NCO’s illicit proﬁts through the tourism industry in the Lake Garda area,
investing in pizzerias, bars, hotels, residences, nightclubs and car dealerships (Cross, 2018,
p. 199). After Italian authorities charged him with various crimes, Pagano hid in Germany,
Spain, Colombia and Venezuela, organizing drug trafﬁcking activities from these countries.
Since ﬂeeing from Italian justice in 1988, Pagano had been living in Spain, Colombia and
Venezuela prior to reaching Cancún (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, pp. 111–112). In the 1990s in
Venezuela, Pagano established a business relationship with the Caruana-Contrera OCG. At
the time, Venezuela was “a place tailor-made for criminals on the run,” particularly of
Italian-origin (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 96). Home to a large Italian population at the
time, Venezuela made “anonymity easy” and was a place where new identities could be
easily obtained (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 96). Pagano transferred himself to Venezuela,
where he established his base and operated under the alias of “Cesare Petruzziello”
(although he would use several aliases). For the Caruana-Contrera network, Pagano helped
establish a major transnational cocaine pipeline from Colombia to Canada, Europe, and
Italy, using Miami as a key transshipment hub where he could count on some Cuban OCG
members working at the port (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, pp. 159–161).
From the scant information available, Pagano appears to have taken up residence in
Cancún in the summer of 1997 (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 187) right at a time when
trafﬁcking drugs through Florida became more complicated. His relocation in Cancún could
have been facilitated by Italian Umberto Naviglia, a “criminally exploitable tie” (von Lampe,
2011) and member of the Camorra OCG. Naviglia, who had connections to both Cuban OCGs
in Miami and “strong contacts with the Juarez Cartel in Mexico,” had met Pagano previously
in Venezuela (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 161). In Cancún, Pagano opened two real estate
businesses – the Royal Mont and euro real estate companies in the famed Zona Hotelera –
while continuing to organize drug shipments for the Caruana-Contrera OCG, according to
police wiretaps (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, pp. 245–246; Proceso, 2003). Posing as tourism
businessman, Pagano became part of the Cancún establishment and a regular at soughtafter social events, and his children attended one of the city’s most prestigious schools
(Proceso, 2003). However, Pagano’s long drug trafﬁcking career came to an end in July 1998
when Mexican authorities arrested him along with his business partner Alberto Minelli, an
expert in ﬁnance, who was well known by US authorities as a “main player in the
international movement of criminal money” (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 159).
The arrests of Pagano and Minelli in Cancún were based on evidence gathered during a
three-year international law enforcement operation involving Italian and Canadian
authorities, the Omertà Project. Interpol described Pagano as “armed and dangerous” and
listed his past crimes as criminal conspiracy, drug trafﬁcking, maﬁa-type criminal
conspiracy, armed robbery, fraud, receiving stolen property, violations of ﬁrearms laws,

theft, rape and forgery (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, pp. 157–158). After transferring him to
Mexico City, Mexican authorities ultimately sent Pagano to Canada, where he would help
the prosecution of the Caruana-Contrera OCG. In exchange for information on his drug
trafﬁcking ventures, Pagano was able to obtain US $100,000 from Canadian authorities and
a place in Italy’s witness protection program (Lamothe and Nicaso, 2001, p. 252). Thanks to
this deal, Pagano avoided the threat of a 28-year prison sentence for drug trafﬁcking, assault
and conspiracy. In 2001, Canadian authorities extradited Pagano to Italy where he started
collaborating with Italian law enforcement. As of 2016, Pagano was living in Italy sheltered
by the country’s witness protection program (Appleby, 2000; Peggio, 2016).
This section shows that while Cancún’s geostrategic location was attractive to Pagano,
given his long drug trafﬁcking career, his relocation took advantage of Cancún’s
characteristics as a tourist resort: high international tourist arrival turnover, assuring
anonymity, and a growing tourist industry attracting foreign investors and capital. Despite
being an outsider in the Mayan Riviera, Pagano was able to present himself as an
international entrepreneur investing in real estate in the late 1990s. While he developed his
business activities in Cancún, Pagano continued to organize transnational drug shipments
as proven by Canadian police wiretaps. Even after the arrest of Pagano and his crime
partner Minelli, Cancún and the Mayan Riviera continued to attract individuals of Italian
origin, tied to transnational networks to pursue illicit goals. In the following section, this
paper will show how such opportunities have been exploited in recent times as well,
particularly in Playa del Carmen, which since the late 1990s has been home to an established
and successful Italian expatriate community.
4. Playa del Carmen and the risks of money laundering: the case of Vincent
Salzano
This section explores how individual criminals with ties to transnational OCGs can take
advantage of the Mayan Riviera’s opportunities for money laundering. Since the creation of
Cancún in the 1970s, Mexico’s Mayan Riviera area has developed a dynamic tourism
industry. Such dynamism, while attracting legal investments, is at risk of being targeted by
criminal actors for money laundering purposes, the core of which involves hiding the illicit
origin of such proﬁts. The money laundering process consists of three basic stages:
placement that distances funds from the criminal activity; layering that hides the trail; and
integration, making funds available to criminal actors (Alasmari, 2012; Fantò, 1999; p. 16).
Billions of dollars of illicit proceeds are laundered annually through the Mexican ﬁnancial
system (U.S. Department of State [USDoS], 2019). The most frequently used money
laundering methods appear to be the placing of bank deposits below the reporting
requirements along with the investment of illicit proceeds in ﬁnancial and real estate assets
(USDoS, 2019). Despite the fact that in 2017 the IMF reported a consistent improvement in
the country’s anti-money laundering regime, Mexico continually faces frequent money
laundering attempts. These schemes stem principally from activities associated with
organized crime (IMF, 2017). Mexico’s main anti-money laundering agency is the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU), which began operations in 1997 (Egmont Group, 2020). Although
according to the IMF (2017) the FIU functions well and generates “good ﬁnancial
intelligence,” Mexico’s ability to detect illicit transactions remains of concern. Furthermore,
impunity in money laundering cases is an additional problem in Mexico. Government
ﬁgures show that only 2% of money laundering investigations opened by the Attorney
General’s Ofﬁce (FGR) between 2007 and 2019 ended in a formal conviction (Sanchez Ley
et al., 2020). In those cases, where prosecutors were able to win a conviction (44 cases),
Mexican judges only gave the defendant the minimum prison time (5 years).
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The large tourism economy of Mexico’s Mayan Riviera encapsulates vulnerabilities that
put the area at high risk of money laundering schemes by individuals, local criminal groups
and transnational OCGs. As seen in previous sections, the Mayan Riviera’s economy is
primarily based on the tourism and real estate sectors. The IMF (2017) has called attention
to the widespread use of cash in Mexico’s tourist areas. Like in other areas of the country,
many hospitality sector establishments in Cancún and Playa del Carmen are registered
under legal ﬁgures – mostly LLCs – that allow some degree of secrecy (IMF, 2017). The
latter also applies to the Mayan Riviera’s real estate sector, which has long represented “a
preferred choice” (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2019)
for hiding of illicit proceeds (Financial Action Task Force of Latin America [FATF and
GAFILAT], 2018; IMF, 2017). Criminals willing to launder illicit proﬁts also take advantage
of Mexico’s regionally integrated and well-connected ﬁnancial sector, its inadequate record
on money laundering prosecutions and the limited knowledge among Mexican non-ﬁnancial
actors (i.e. notaries, real estate agents) of complex laundering schemes (IMF, 2017). The
Mayan Riviera is also at risk for money laundering given that it is the main gateway for
international tourists into Mexico and given the country’s relatively weak border controls
(IMF, 2017). Overall, this paper concurs with Binder (Binder, 2019) in afﬁrming that Mexico,
despite its geographical proximity to offshore tax havens (i.e. Belize), can provide
“formidable spaces for onshore money laundering.” This fact has not gone unnoticed for
individuals connected to transnational OCGs.
Currently, there is no comprehensive money laundering assessment of the Mayan
Riviera’s risks to money laundering. However, we can point to ofﬁcial data about the size of
the tourism and real estate sectors and envision the setting where legitimate and illegal
business operations coexist. While they do not encompass all existing establishments in the
area, statistics (INEGI, 2017) show that there are at least 221 so-called tourism-certiﬁed
hotels in Playa del Carmen and 187 in Cancún. The vast majority of these hotels are in the
top “ﬁve-star” category. Both locations also concentrate the majority of restaurants, bars
and nightlife establishments in Quintana Roo: 560 in Playa del Carmen and 734 in Cancún
(INEGI, 2017). As for the real estate sector, a recent analysis of online residential listings
shows that the vast majority of properties offered for sale and rental in Quintana Roo are
located in the Mayan Riviera area: 34% in Playa del Carmen and 49% in Cancún (Lamudi,
2019). This is not a surprise given that 65.9% of the total state’s housing is located in Playa
del Carmen and Cancún (INEGI, 2017). Online residential listings in Playa del Carmen and
Cancún ﬁt the demand of an afﬂuent clientele, with a majority of them falling within the
“Residential Plus Category” (US$175,000 to US$500,000) and the “Premium Category”
(above US$500,000). Given that Mexican average wages are far lower than those in
industrialized countries, top listings in the Mayan Riviera tend to be more accessible for
foreign buyers (see OECD data Indicators on average wages). This fact is reﬂected in local
real estate agencies catering to foreigners, including the use of the English language.
Foreign buyers are not perceived as unusual. Given the sheer size of its tourism industry
and its real estate market, it should not be a surprise that the Mayan Riviera offers a wide
range of opportunities to hide illicit proceeds.
A review of open source data shows that international criminals have taken advantage of
the tourism and real estate infrastructure of the Mayan Riviera for money laundering
schemes since at least the 1990s. Along with Cancún, Playa del Carmen’s geographic
position and surrounding coastline have made it an attractive place for criminals. Like in
Cancún, the presence of non-Mexican individuals involved in transnational criminal
networks has been reported in Playa del Carmen since the late 1990s (Caballero, 1998a,
1998b, 1998c). In 1998, Playa del Carmen’s mayor acknowledged that foreign individuals

tied to transnational crime had been detected in town (Caballero, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). At the
time, the mayor was referring to the arrest of two German citizens in Playa del Carmen the
year before: Harry Walter Pfell and Otto Alexander Nesnidal. Mexican authorities charged
both individuals with drug trafﬁcking and money laundering (Caballero, 1998a, 1998b,
1998c). Pfell, a fugitive wanted by the International Crime Police Organization (INTERPOL),
was planning to buy a hotel in the Playa del Carmen area (Caballero, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).
Based on open source information, this is the oldest publicly known case involving
transnational criminals and money laundering in the buoyant Playa del Carmen tourist
sector.
Mexican authorities rarely publicize money laundering cases. One exception occurred in
March 2014 and involved a prominent Playa del Carmen entrepreneur. In that year, the
Mexican Attorney’s General Ofﬁce (FGR) initiated a complaint against Vincenzo Salzano
(also known as Vincent). Salzano is an entrepreneur born in Italy in 1958 (speciﬁcally in the
town of Santa Maria La Fossa in the Italian region of Campania) but who became a US
citizen in 1979 (DOJ, 1979) and who had made several investments in Playa del Carmen. At
the time, Mexican organized-crime prosecutors ordered the freezing of Salzano’s and some of
his family members’ accounts together with the ones of other prominent Quintana Roo’s
entrepreneurs and politicians on suspicion of “ﬁnancial operations with resources of
unlawful origin” (PGR, 2014). Although information on the exact circumstances that
triggered the investigation into Salzano by Mexican authorities is unknown, it is probable
that it was related to his arrest on US soil in October 2013. Salzano and his son and son-inlaw had been arrested at the Baton Rouge airport in Louisiana when they stopped to refuel a
private jet loaded with 32 kilograms of cocaine (70 pounds) worth US$1m (CBS News, 2014;
United States of America v. Vincent Salzano also known as Vincenzo Salzano [U.S. v. V.S],
2014a, 2014 b). In December 2014, Salzano pleaded guilty before a US federal court to
conspiracy to distribute drugs and received a jail sentence of 60 months. It is worth noting
that Salzano, a longtime resident of Colorado, had a previous criminal record, having served
a six-month prison sentence in 1992 for cocaine distribution in the USA (U.S. v. V. S., 2013).
By the time that Mexico’s Attorney General acted against Salzano in March 2014, many of
the bank accounts that were at the heart of the investigation had reportedly been emptied,
highlighting the weaknesses of Mexico’s anti-money laundering efforts (Noticaribe, 2014a,
2014b).
Salzano’s arrival in Playa del Carmen dates back to sometime around 1998. His previous
criminal record in the USA does not seem to have been an impediment to starting two real
estate businesses in town: Caribe Investment Properties in 1998 and Grand Enterprises in
2004 (U.S. v. V.S., 2018a). He also developed a ﬁtness center company, Evolve Fitness Center,
that by 2013 had a total of eight clubs throughout Playa del Carmen, Cancún, and Tulúm,
employing some 100 people in total. In the USA, Salzano also owned a home and commercial
establishment, including a car dealership, valued at approximately US $4m (U.S. v. V.S.,
2018a). While a detailed account of the nature of his investments in Playa del Carmen is not
publicly available, Salzano succeeded in hiding his involvement in nefarious drug
trafﬁcking activities throughout the years. When the news of his arrest in the USA reached
Playa del Carmen in 2013, local newspapers reacted in disbelief, shocked that a wellrespected “Italian” entrepreneur could have been accused of such a serious crime
(Noticaribe, 2013). Given his prior drug trafﬁcking history and the subsequent Mexican
money laundering investigation, questions arise about the origin of Salzano’s resources
invested in the Mayan Riviera, his business contacts and other potential hidden activities
that he could have carried out in the area.
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While there is no comprehensive money laundering risk assessment of the Mayan
Riviera, the analysis of a case like Salzano’s illustrates at least four key vulnerabilities
exploitable by money laundering schemes. A ﬁrst vulnerability stems from the combination
of an established expatriate community and of a dynamic tourism industry making the
arrival of international entrepreneurs like Salzano unexceptional. Despite his past as drug
trafﬁcker, Salzano was able to invest in high-risk sectors – real estate and health clubs –
without raising red ﬂags in Playa del Carmen [3]. In fact, ﬁtness clubs speciﬁcally have been
highlighted globally as potential hotspots for drug dealing (Møller et al., 2015, p. 447; Groom,
2016; Il Messaggero, 2017). A second vulnerability evidenced by the Salzano case is the
dubious ability of Mexican authorities to perform successful prosecutions. According to
newspaper reports, Salzano’s Mexican accounts were already emptied when the Attorney
General’s Ofﬁce (PGR) ordered their freezing in March 2014 (Noticaribe, 2014a, 2014b).
There is no known record that the Mexican investigation into Salzano’s resources reached
any conviction, showcasing the country’s limited capacity to conduct anti-money laundering
enforcement. A third vulnerability evidenced by the Salzano case is how some individuals
can proﬁt from a fragmented enforcement space where LEAs in different countries do not
necessarily communicate between each other. After a US federal court convicted Salzano for
cocaine trafﬁcking in 2015, it is not publicly known whether U.S. authorities shared with
Mexican authorities any concerns about his sizeable investments in the Mayan Riviera. One
would assume both U.S. and Mexican authorities would be interested in looking into
Salzano’s numerous businesses in the area. Moreover, U.S. court records show that Salzano
was able to gain permission during his supervised release in 2018 to travel “periodically [to
Playa del Carmen] so that his businesses do not cease to exist.” It is unknown whether the
USA asked Mexican authorities to monitor Salzano’s activities during these trips (U.S. v. V.
S., 2018 b; U.S. v. V.S., 2018c). Open source information shows that Salzano’s businesses in
the Mayan Riviera have continued operating since then. A fourth vulnerability made evident
by the Salzano case is how convicted criminals of Italian origin, posing as entrepreneurs, can
blend in the large law-abiding Italian expatriate community of Playa del Carmen without
raising suspicions. This last vulnerability will be further studied in the following section.
5. Mayan Riviera as a haven for international fugitives: the case of Ivan
Fornari
In this ﬁnal section, this paper explores how individual criminals linked to transnational
OCGs take advantage of tourist resorts to evade justice while on the run from law
enforcement, while at the same time continuing to frequently engage in both legitimate and
illicit activities. The section ﬁrst reviews the phenomenon overall and then analyzes speciﬁc
cases of international fugitives in the Mayan Riviera. In stark contrast to academic focus on
property crime and crime mobility, relocation choices and mobility of international fugitives
have rarely been systematically analyzed (Drealan, 2007; Van Daele and Vander Beken,
2009; von Lampe, 2009, 2011). Criminal fugitives are individuals attempting to evade justice.
According to INTERPOL’s Fugitive Investigative Support (no date), an individual can
become a fugitive after being charged with a crime but before arrest; ﬂeeing law
enforcement while on bail to avoid prosecution; or prison escape. By necessity of having to
hide from law enforcement, fugitives tend to be mobile and opportunistic, and they
sometimes cross international borders to hide using real or fake documents (or no
documents at all). Speciﬁcally, international fugitives have long targeted holiday
destinations as hiding places (i.e. Al Jazeera, 2005; Fuller, 2011).
While no comprehensive information is available in the public domain, it is safe to
assume that LEAs put particular attention on holiday destinations as hiding places. In 2017,

for example, European law enforcement – through the European Network of Fugitive Active
Search Teams (ENFAST) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement
Cooperation (Europol) – sought help to ﬁnd the exact location of some of its “Most Wanted”
fugitives. Europol launched a campaign seeking information on these fugitives using digital
postcards that featured well-known European tourist landmarks and stressing that
criminals did not “deserve a vacation.” Despite fugitives’ need to stay off law enforcement’s
radar, they may still engage in social and economic activities abroad. International fugitives
can become involved in legal businesses or continue illicit ventures while in hiding. This
paper uses the term “actively absconding” to refer to the involvement of fugitives in legal or
illegal economic activities while hiding from LEAs. The term originates from the work of
dalla Chiesa (2016, Location No. 2597–2670) and his concept of latitanza attiva applied to the
ability of the Italian Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta maﬁa-type OCGs fugitives to inﬁltrate the
legal tourist sector in Spain. According to dalla Chiesa, these actors were able to carry out
legal activities (e.g. bars restaurants, real estate and food import export companies) as well
as illegal ventures (e.g. drug trafﬁcking and money laundering) to such an extent that they
even “reshape” the Spanish tourist sector (dalla Chiesa, 2016, Location No. 2599).
Crossing borders is not always an easy task for criminal fugitives. They can encounter
unfamiliar or even hostile environments, exposing them to the risk of behaving in an
unconventional or outright suspicious way. Although the presence of established contacts
(i.e. family members, friends, afﬁliates) in an alien territory is a feature of some speciﬁc
OCGs like the Italian Camorra (Allum, 2016, pp. 20–26) and Calabrian ‘Ndrangheta
maﬁa-type OCGs (Sciarrone, 2009, pp. 146–147; Sciarrone and Storti, 2014), the presence of
some support and collaboration in an unfamiliar territory can be considered a necessity for
fugitives to survive “below the radar” and keep a fugitive’s presence inconspicuous. Without
support of someone familiar with local culture, language and customs, foreigners can stand
out, and in the case of international criminal fugitives, be vulnerable to the scrutiny of local
LEAs, perhaps even more so than domestic offenders (von Lampe, 2011). An established
network of contacts or criminal ties can also facilitate new criminal activities while actively
absconding.
Since the early 19th century, Mexico has been regarded as a preferred destination for
international fugitives, particularly due to its territorial proximity to the USA (Fuller, 2015;
Jordan and Sullivan, 2001). Mexico remains attractive to US citizens on the lam given that
they do not need to present a passport when traveling by land and also given the high
volume of vehicles crossing the USA–Mexico border making inspections random and
infrequent. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought stronger border enforcement
between the USA and Mexico, particularly when traveling by air. However, a review of open
source information shows that the Mexican territory remains an attractive destination
for fugitives of US justice. According to the report Ten Most Wanted Fugitives 60th
Anniversary, 1950–2010 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 12 of the 26 most
wanted fugitives arrested between 1998 and 2009 were found in Mexico. In 2001, the then
head of INTERPOL’s Mexico ofﬁce summarized to The Washington Post: “[. . .] it is one of
the oldest stories in American crime: Everybody runs to Mexico. South of the border has
long been viewed as a place of warm beaches and cold drinks, and little chance of getting
caught” (Jordan and Sullivan, 2001).
While it is not a surprise that US fugitives may choose to cross into Mexico given the
geographic proximity, the role that Mexico plays as a desirable destination for non-US
international fugitives (e.g. from Europe) has rarely been explored. This paper intends to
bridge this gap by building the ﬁrst comprehensive database of international fugitives
apprehended in the Mexican Mayan Riviera since the late 1990’s as shown in Appendix.
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The Mayan Riviera has many characteristics to make it a favorable hiding place: a welldeveloped tourist industry, air connectivity with direct ﬂights to 97 international airports
via the Cancún International Airport, visa-free access for North American and European
Union tourists, a high turnover of international arrivals and the presence of expatriate
communities in the area (SEDETOUR, 2015). The high frequency of ﬂights to Cancún can
even provide opportunities for reconnaissance trips for individuals looking for a permanent
relocation while fugitives without raising alarm. Cancún’s airport can also be used as a
convenient layover to escape to other Central, North and South American destinations. For
example, Ivan Fasciani, member of the Fasciani Italian maﬁa OCG from the Lazio region,
wanted for a ten-year prison sentence in Italy, recently sought to escape to Belize (where he
had established contacts) via Cancún before being arrested in 2019 (Frignani, 2019).
The Mayan Riviera’s dynamic tourist industry makes it easy for foreign individuals to
engage in temporary economic activities without requiring certiﬁcation and in a favorable
context where knowing a foreign language can be considered a plus. In addition to the above
advantages, corruption among Mexican public ofﬁcials, including law and immigration
enforcement, has proven to be exploited by fugitives on the run. Recently, investigative
reporting has shown that at least one member of a Romanian-origin OCG beneﬁted from the
use of forged documents for entry into Mexico via the Cancún International Airport
(Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project [OCCRP], 2020). Until at least 2004,
several Mexican airports booths lacked the adequate computer system to process the
information required by the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) useful to take
the necessary measures when a passenger is “red-ﬂagged” (Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) – Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de México (ITAM), 2004).
While immigration enforcement at airports has strengthened – as some arrests show – it is
not possible to establish from open source information whether Cancún’s airport booths
are fully equipped at the present time to effectively detect “red-ﬂagged” passengers
(CSIS-ITAM, 2004). In sum, international fugitives can count on the Mayan Riviera’s several
vulnerabilities to make their absconding successful.
Given the absence of comprehensive data on fugitives, and based on a thorough review
of open-source documents (local news outlets, government press releases, international
agencies and books), this paper contains the ﬁrst systematized list of 34 international
fugitives’ apprehensions in the resort towns of Cancún and Playa del Carmen between 1997
and 2019 (Appendix). One must note that LEAs do not make public all the arrests they
perform and that it is likely that other fugitives are hiding in the area without raising
suspicion. Most of the arrests in the data set are North American and European nationals
(21 and 7 arrests, respectively), but the list also includes nationals from Israel, Argentina,
Colombia and Cuba. While a mandatory visa could be a barrier for fugitives from Asia or
Africa to arrive in Mexico, all 34 individuals in the list are nationals from countries that can
enter Mexico as tourists without needing one. The duration of the 34 fugitives’ stay in the
Mayan Riviera varies from just a few hours at the airport to over two decades. All 34
fugitives were wanted by foreign LEAs, including three with a “Red Notice” from
INTERPOL (see Appendix). Two of the fugitives were actually found dead, execution style,
in Cancún: one Canadian national tied to the Vito Rizzuto Italian-Canadian maﬁa-type OCG
and one Romanian national tied to an OCG involved in international credit card fraud. In 22
of 34 cases, fugitives on the list had known links to various transnational OCGs based in the
USA, Argentina, Israel, Cuba, Italy and Canada. Criminal charges against individuals in the
list include drug trafﬁcking, money laundering, credit card fraud, child pornography,
human trafﬁcking and sex exploitation. A total of 12 cases in the list were individuals with
no known connection to OCGs and face charges including sex-related crimes, murder, drug

offenses, fraud, robbery and arson. At least 9 of the 34 international fugitives arrested in the
Mayan Riviera had been able to engage in either licit or illicit economic activities while on
the lam. They engaged in “active absconding” (dalla Chiesa, 2016) managing or working in
tattoo parlors, retail stores, restaurants, and nightlife establishments. Even while opensource data is often incomplete (means of transport, routes and travel documents are usually
lacking), the list shows that in nearly all 34 cases their arrival to the Mayan Riviera was
successful.
The case of Italian national Ivan Fornari provides a paradigmatic example of how the
tourist industry and the embedded entrepreneurial Italian community of Playa del Carmen
can be vulnerable to inﬁltration by fugitives. Originally from the Italian region of Sardinia,
Ivan Fornari has been described by Italian police as a “prominent member” of local
organized crime involved in drug trafﬁcking with links to international networks,
particularly those in Spain (Polizia di Stato, 2017). In April 2014, Ivan Fornari was arrested
in Sardinia as part of larger international counter narcotics operation known to the Italian
police as “Operazione Bitumat” (Italian Parliament, House of Representatives, 2014; Polizia
di Stato, 2014). Launched by the Spanish Police in 2013, the operation sought to dismantle a
transnational criminal organization involved in hashish trafﬁcking between Spain and
Sardinia (Polizia di Stato, 2014). Fornari’s collaboration with the Italian police netted the
arrests of other individuals and the seizure of 64 kilograms of hashish (Agenzia ANSA,
2017). After being convicted and sentenced to 5 years and 7 months in jail (a lenient sentence
thanks to his collaboration), Fornari ﬂed Sardinia and was declared a fugitive from Italian
law in May 2016 (Agenzia ANSA, 2017).
Fornari is believed to have arrived in Mexico toward the end of 2016, via Spain where he
could probably count on his network of contacts for support. Just a few months later, in
February 2017, INTERPOL issued a Red Notice for Fornari. While the details of his travel
are not entirely clear, Fornari could have reached Cancún easily, beneﬁting from direct
ﬂights and Mexico’s visa-free entry program for tourists from the European Union. After his
capture in March 2017, Mexican authorities revealed that Fornari had been expelled from
the country because he had violated the terms of his immigration status, presumably as a
tourist. At the time of his capture, Mexican authorities may have opted to follow an
expedited deportation of Fornari rather than waiting for a formal extradition request from
Italy (Agencia EFE, 2017; Periodistas Quintana Roo, 2017).
At the time of his arrest in March 2017, Fornari was managing a small restaurant,
Controvento Sardegna, right in the heart of Playa del Carmen’s famed Quinta Avenida
district and in the proximity of ritzy shops and restaurants. Just one block from the beach,
Fornari boasted on social media of having purchased the restaurant and renamed it after his
home region of Sardinia. Similar real estate investments in the Playa del Carmen downtown
area are valued at US$150,000 [4]. While exact details on his arrival are unclear, questions
emerge about why Fornari’s criminal past and immigration status were not an impediment
to managing a restaurant in a prime location of Playa del Carmen and how he raised the
funds to acquire the property.
Ivan Fornari ended up living in Playa del Carmen for approximately six months, actively
absconding as a respectable restaurateur and living in a downtown apartment complex.
Fornari was probably not overly worried about being targeted by Mexican police. More than
9,000 kilometers (5,500 miles) from his native region of Sardinia, he also did not seem
worried about Italian police being able to track him down. Fornari appeared so conﬁdent of
not being detected that he routinely published pictures and videos on a Facebook page
without even changing his name. His vanity and carelessness would be crucial for the Italian
police and INTERPOL to track him down and provide Mexican authorities with leads that
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resulted his arrest in March 2017. Italian law enforcement shared with the public that
Fornari’s arrest would not have been possible without the analysis of Fornari’s Facebook
pictures from Playa del Carmen by the beach, at the gym and other locations including his
Controvento Sardegna restaurant (Pinna, 2017).
During all this time, Fornari was able to settle in Playa del Carmen camouﬂaged among
the large and law-abiding Italian expatriate community. As described in a previous section
of this paper, small Italian-owned businesses are a central feature of Playa del Carmen since
the 1990s. Some of these entrepreneurs left Italy not only attracted by proﬁtable investment
opportunities but also following their dream of opening “a chiringuito on the beach” (a beach
bar), leaving everything behind and starting out a new life (Donato, 2014, Location
No. 1073). This clustering of Italian-origin people (sharing a similar ethnic and social
background, similar life goals, and in some cases working together) can help in networking
and facilitate the integration of newcomers (Kleemans, 2014). Newcomers like Fornari,
posing as entrepreneurs, are not perceived necessarily as outsiders, and this may aid in
lowering the threshold of scrutiny of an investor’s past. In many cases, having enough
economic means can be enough to settle in Playa del Carmen.
Given Fornari’s case, law-abiding Italian entrepreneurs in Playa del Carmen (and in the
entire Mayan Riviera) should be interested in proactively engaging in establishing
prevention strategies to impede the settlement of fugitives posing as entrepreneurs in their
community. Implementing of prevention strategies is even more relevant considering that it
has been proven that the targeting of legitimate businesses in the tourist sector can be a
potential step for criminal groups tied to Italian maﬁa-type OCGs (Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta
in particular) to fully settle down in a new territory (Sciarrone and Storti, 2014; Antimaﬁa
Investigation Directorate Rome [DIA], 2018a, p. 199; 2018 b, pp. 88–89; 2019a, 267–271;
2019 b, p. 215).
6. Conclusions
Despite the fact that tourism, and the cross-border movement of people related to it, has
become a key economic sector around the globe, academic literature has seldom analyzed
the relationship between tourist resorts and transnational crime in a systematic fashion.
This paper begins to ﬁll this gap by outlining a framework of how individuals linked to
transnational OCGs can exploit tourist resorts for criminal purposes. Understood as an
initial exploration of an understudied topic, this paper analyzed how Italian-origin
individuals linked to transnational OCGs have been able to use two global tourist meccas in
the Mexico’s Caribbean coast: the resorts of Cancún and Playa del Carmen in the so-called
Mayan Riviera. Research for this paper involved a comprehensive review of open source
information going back 23 years (periodical press, historical accounts, court records,
government releases) in three different languages (Spanish, Italian, English). Focusing on
three Italian-born individuals (Oreste Pagano, Vincenzo Salzano and Ivan Fornari), the
paper explored how people involved in transnational crime have used the Mayan Riviera as
a platform to broker and oversee criminal deals and operations (Pagano in Cancún); as an
area suitable to launder illicit proﬁts derived from criminal activities (Salzano in Playa del
Carmen); and as a place to hide while fugitives to elude law enforcement authorities (Ivan
Fornari in Playa del Carmen).
This paper has focused on the individual dimension of transnational crime and its
relation to the Mayan Riviera’s tourist resorts. The fact that individuals tied to transnational
crime posing as tourists and entrepreneurs may have taken advantage of highly networked
logistical and ﬁnancial structures of mass tourist resorts is not a surprise. What is
concerning is that such highly networked logistical and ﬁnancial structures can serve as

criminal networking platforms to extensively facilitate their criminal enterprises. In fact,
this paper describes how at the same time that Cancún was becoming the crown jewel of
Mexico’s tourism industry, it was also becoming a relevant transshipment point in a
prominent cocaine trafﬁcking route from South and Central America to the USA. In 1997,
Italian national Oreste Pagano took advantage of the resort’s insertion in the drug
trafﬁcking route and its tourism-oriented economy to relocate. While in Cancún, by posing
as a real estate entrepreneur, Pagano was able to facilitate drug shipments from South
America for the Canadian-Italian maﬁa-type Caruana-Contrera OCG. Since then, the two
Mayan Riviera’s resorts have continued to offer to individuals with criminal records further
opportunities for relocation. As demonstrated in the case of Italian-born US citizen Vincenzo
Salzano in Playa del Carmen, individuals with criminal records can exploit the cosmopolitan
setting of a location that 30 years ago was just a ﬁshing village. Relevantly, the
fragmentation of the international law enforcement space allowed Salzano to move forward
with investments in sectors at high risk of money laundering like real estate and gyms in the
Mayan Riviera. By exploiting the Playa del Carmen’s cosmopolitan environment, Salzano
was able to remain prosperous even when Mexican authorities opened a money laundering
case against him after he was indicted (and later convicted) in the USA for conspiracy to
distribute 32 kilos of cocaine. This paper also showed how, during the same period of time,
the Mayan Riviera was a formidable destination for international fugitives including Italian
nationals. Overall, the author found 34 known international fugitives taking refuge in the
Mayan Riviera since 1997. In particular, the study focused on Ivan Fornari, a fugitive of
Italian justice who had been arrested as part of a counterdrug operation in southern Europe
and who reached Playa del Carmen. Fornari’s case showcases how weak border controls,
international connectivity and, most relevantly, the size of the Italian expatriate community
in the area allowed Fornari to remain undetected and even manage a restaurant. Again, this
study is just an initial outline to encourage more studies on tourist resorts as venues for
transnational crime.
In the three case studies presented in this paper, the mass tourist resorts of Cancún and
Playa del Carmen have demonstrated to be functional to commit crimes for individuals
linked to transnational organized crime during the past 30 years. The criminogenic nature of
both resorts over time conﬁrms that tourist locations around the world continue to function
as “venues for crime,” as noted by Ryan (1993), and continue to provide “convergent
opportunities” for crime as underscored by Crotts (1996). For these reasons, the work of both
authors remains overall valid today. The intense cross-border movement of people arriving
in mass tourist resorts, the high ﬂows of foreign currency and the use of cash transactions
are still functional to hide crimes even in an Internet era when electronic payments are
taking over. However, further research on this topic should be encouraged to establish
whether a possible replacement of cash transactions by virtual currencies (e.g. Bitcoin) or
phone payments may diminish or neutralize the opportunities to hide crime in tourist resorts
in Mexico and elsewhere. Additionally, further ﬁeld research should be conducted on-site to
deepen the understanding of how legitimate actors (law enforcement, businessmen, trade
groups, etc.) perceive the presence of individuals suspected to have links to transnational
crime among the Mayan Riviera’s expatriate communities. Nevertheless, cooperation could
be problematic since reputation matters for tourist resorts and businesses so dependent on
tourism like the Mayan Riviera. Local authorities and entrepreneurs may be tempted not to
disclose the ways through which local and transnational OCGs exploit their tourist
localities. However, merely shoving the problem under the rug is dangerously shortsighted.
Studying the relationship between transnational crime and the resorts in the Mayan Riviera
gains even more relevance at present given two recent developments:
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The COVID-19 pandemic is creating new opportunities for transnational OCGs to
penetrate legitimate economies, particularly in the tourism sector globally. The
massive losses of revenues and the increasing indebtedness of many tourism
entrepreneurs make the industry even more vulnerable to penetration and even
outright takeover of many businesses by transnational OCGs. This phenomenon is
already happening in different regions of Italy like Veneto, Tuscany and Liguria
(Il Fatto Quotidiano, 2020; Il Giorno, 2020; Carnevali, 2020). In fact, the Italian
government has been already warning about the increasing risk of inﬁltration
by Italian maﬁa-type OCGs targeting the tourism economy (Governo Italiano –
Ministero dell’Interno, 2020). This is particularly relevant for small businesses, often
family based. These small and very small entrepreneurs are pressed by the crisis
and in debt, and could be more prone to accept cash offers to sell their business.
Besides risking the value of their assets, these entrepreneurs may be more willing to
overlook scrutiny procedures and take the risk of facilitating illegal activity. For
this reason, legitimate entrepreneurs and authorities in Cancún and Playa del
Carmen – particularly those Italian-owned businesses – should not let their guard
down.
While the Mexican Caribbean cocaine trafﬁcking route through the Mayan Riviera
became less prominent in the early 2000s, a review of literature in the public domain
signals that it might have been reactivated recently. This assumption is linked to
the discovery of several clandestine airstrips and of ultra-light planes landing/
crashing in Quintana Roo. In some cases, Mexican authorities have made seizures of
tons of cocaine coming from South America. At the same time, reports of seizures of
cocaine bundles by the sea have increased constantly since at least 2017 (Noticaribe,
2017b; Noticaribe, 2018; Noticaribe, 2019; Noticaribe, 2020). The issue grows even
more complex as local OCGs in Mexico could also be targeting the area to use it
again as their own platform for drug trafﬁcking and laundering operations.

The factors cited above could undermine the reputation of tourist resorts in the Mayan
Riviera and reduce tourist ﬂows to them. Thus, local and national authorities in Mexico need
to devote extensive intelligence and law enforcement capacity to prevent and eradicate
inﬁltration by transnational OCGs to preserve the ﬁnancial integrity and the physical safety
of the Mayan Riviera’s tourist resorts. Eventually, local civil society in Quintana Roo also
has a role to play. The local legal business community and business groups in the area can
adopt best international practices against money laundering. They can diligently promote
this culture among smaller local businesses in the Mayan Riviera. Overall, the author hopes
that the analysis of tourist resorts in Mexico contributes to the discussion regarding
transnational crime both in the North American region and beyond.
Notes
1. Of the 750 million global container movements reported per year, only an estimated 2% are
inspected (EMCDDA, 2019).
2. The exact number of Italian residents it is unclear. The author of this paper has sent two e- mail
requests to the Italian Embassy in Mexico City and to the Italian Consulate in Playa del Carmen
asking for the number of Italian residents in the municipality of Solidaridad without receiving
any reply to the request.
3. Mexican criminals have, of course, equally taken advantage of the money laundering
opportunities in the Mayan Riviera. Recently, Mexican authorities have charged Quintana

Roo’s former governor Roberto Borge (in oﬃce, 2011-2016) on several criminal charges
including corruption, embezzlement and money laundering. Borge was extradited to
Mexico after having been arrested in Panama, and is currently in a federal prison (Varillas,
2020).
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4. Prices have been converted from Mexican pesos taking as reference listings of commercial
buildings for sale in downtown Playa del Carmen (Lamudi, no date).
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Unclear
Unclear: fugitive
2003

USA
(New Jersey)
Italian

2004
John Forrest
(male)
2007
Enrico Carella (male)

2010
Roger Charles Day Jr
(male)
2012
William A. White
(male)

5

7

9

8

6

2012
Vincent Legrend
Walters (male)

Unclear

1998
Italian
Alberto Minelli (male)

Probably in the
Summer of 1997

Italian

Unclear, evaded
probation terms
in 2011, believed
to belong to a
neo-Nazi group
Probably 1988

USA
(Virginia)

USA
(California)

Probably 2008

USA
(Virginia)

German

4

3

2

Unclear,
probably years
before
Unclear

German

1997
Harry Walter Pfell
(male)
1997
Otto Alexander
Nesdinal (male)
1998
Oreste Pagano (male)

Nationality

Murder

Wire fraud, aggravated
identity theft, money
laundering
Violation of probation
terms

Arson

Fraud

Drug trafﬁcking and
money laundering

Drug trafﬁcking and
money laundering

Drug trafﬁcking and
money laundering

Drug trafﬁcking and
money laundering

Year of arrival in
the Mayan
Accusation – related
Riviera
crime

1

Year of arrest
Progressive Name
no.
Gender

Cancún
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government

Cancún
Mexican authorities and
INTERPOL
Cancún
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government

Playa del Carmen
INTERPOL and Mexican
authorities
Playa del Carmen
NTERPOL and Mexican
authorities
Cancún
Mexican police under request
of international LEAs
Cancún
Mexican authorities under
request of international LEAs
Cancún
Bounty Hunter

Arrest Location
Arrest Authority

(continued)

(Fox News Channel,
2012)

(Noticaribe, 2012a)

(Green, 2010)

(La Nuova Venezia,
2007)

(Morgan, 2004)

(Caballero, 1998a,
1998b, 1998c)

(Caballero, 1998a,
1998b, 1998c)

(Caballero, 1997)

(Caballero, 1997)

Reference
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Table A1.
International
fugitives detected in
Cancún and Playa
del carmen

Table A1.

2013
Walter Lee Williams

USA (state
2014
Jeffrey Janssen Anuth unclear)
(male)

15.
2014
Calvin Nagy (male)
2015
Jason Allen Beeching
(male)

14

15

16

Unclear
Probably 2010

USA (state
unclear)

Unclear

Probably 2011

A few hours:
arrested at
Cancun’s airport
upon arrival

Unclear

2009

USA
(Colorado)

USA
(California)

Canadian

Unclear

13

12

11

USA
(California)

2012
Michael Joseph
Chavez (male)
2012
For security reasons
no identity details are
available (male)
2013
Jimmy Cournoyer
(male)

10

Nationality

Sexual intercourse with a
minor

Sexual assault and
misdemeanor assault

Fraud and tax evasion
scams

Child pornography and
sexual abuse (minor)

40 felony counts, among
them drug trafﬁcking

Murder

Sexual abuse minors

Year of arrival in
the Mayan
Accusation – related
Riviera
crime

Cancún
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government,
located through an
INTERPOL Red Notice
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government;
Cancún
Mexican authorities at the
request of USA Located
through an INTERPOL Red
Notice
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government
Playa del Carmen
Arrested by Mexican
authorities for public
disturbance and deported to
the USA

Cancún
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities and
INTERPOL

Arrest Location
Arrest Authority

(continued)

(Noticaribe. 2015)

(CBSN Denver,
2014)

(Noticaribe, 2014)

(Newcomb, 2013)

(Thibault, 2013)

(Noticaribe. 2012c)

(Noticaribe, 2012b)

Reference
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Year of arrest
Progressive Name
no.
Gender
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24

23

22

21

20

19

18

17

Probably 2017
Probably 2017

Cuban
Cuban

Probably 2016

Italian

2018
Jorge Rondon
Martínez (male)
2018
Leidy Labrada de la
Guardia (female)

Unclear

USA (state
unclear)

2016
Christopher Daniels
(male)
2017
Ivan Fornari (male)
Unclear: fugitive
since 1994

Unclear

USA (North
Carolina)

2016
Anthony Avniel
Awan (male)

Colombian

Probably 2015

USA
(Michigan)

2017
Juan Carlos Marín
Cardona (male)

Probably 2013

Nationality

Partner of Jorge Rondon
Martínez accused for the
same crimes

Large scale credit card
scam

Drug trafﬁcking

International drug
trafﬁcking

Criminal drug related
record

Murder, fraud, unlawful
possession of ﬁrearm

Bank robbery and
probation terms evasion

Drug related crimes and
illegal use of weapons

Year of arrival in
the Mayan
Accusation – related
Riviera
crime

USA
(Michigan)

2015
John Castellanos
(male)
2016
Joseph Andersen
(male)

Year of arrest
Progressive Name
no.
Gender
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities at the
request of US Government
Playa del Carmen
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government
Playa del Carmen
Arrested Mexican authorities
for reported harassment
deported to the USA
Playa del Carmen
Arrested with Anthony Avniel
Awan
Playa del Carmen
Mexican authorities at the
request of Italian authorities
via INTERPOL Red Notice
Playa del Carmen
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government
Cancún. Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government

Arrest Location
Arrest Authority

(continued)

(Radio television
Martí, 2018)

(Radio television
Martí, 2018)

(Noticaribe, 2017a)

(Reforma, 2017)

(The Yucatan
Times, 2016)

(The Yucatan
Times, 2016)

(Noticaribe, 2016)

(Expediente
QuintanaRoo, 2015)

Reference
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2018
Michael Graham
Cudmore (male)

2018
Daniel Mario
Tomassetti (male)

2018
Sorinel Constantin
Marcu (male,
deceased)

2019
Daryoush “Darius”
Bunyad (male)

26

27

28

29

USA
(California)

Romanian

Canadian

Canadian

2018
Canadian
Daniele Ranieri (male)

25

Nationality

Since 2017

Probably May
2017. He is
believed to have
reached Daniele
Ranieri
2017, he is
believed to have
reached Daniele
Ranieri with
Cudmore
Probably 2014

2015

Sexual battery and
molesting

Attempted murder

2 homicides (Musitano –
Barberi) related to
Canadian Italian maﬁa
OCG in Hamilton

Extortion and person of
interest in the Musitano –
Barberi murder in
Hamilton – Ontario
Canada. Member of the
Vito Rizzuto maﬁa OCG
based in Montreal
2 homicides (Musitano –
Barberi) related to
Canadian Italian maﬁa
OCG in Hamilton

Year of arrival in
the Mayan
Accusation – related
Riviera
crime

Cancún
Wanted by Canadian and
INTERPOL found dead
(probably executed) in June
2020 in rural Mexico
Cancún.
Still wanted by Canadian
authorities and INTERPOL
who believe he might still in
Mexico
Cancún
Wanted by Romanian
authorities through
INTERPOL Found dead
(executed)
Playa del Carmen
Arrested by Mexican
authorities as recognized by a
bystander and deported at
request of the US Government

Cancún. Wanted by Canadian
authorities. Found dead in a
ditch, in Cancún, executed

Arrest Location
Arrest Authority

(continued)

(FOX2 KTVU, 2019)

(Krebs on Security,
2019)

(Hristova, 2020)

(Hristova, 2020)

(Martin – Robbins,
2018)

Reference
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Year of arrest
Progressive Name
no.
Gender
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34

33

32

31

30

Israeli

USA
(Minnesota)
Argentinian

Canadian

USA
(Colorado)

2019
Dylan Bennet (male)

2019
Raúl Luis Martins
Coggiola (male)

2019
Vincent Yen Tek
Chiu (male)

2019
Ivan. “G.” (male)

Nationality

2019
Erez Akrishevsky
(male)

Year of arrest
Progressive Name
no.
Gender

Sex exploitation and
money laundering

Murder

Murder. Member of an
Israeli OCG

2017

Murder

Arrested at
International drug
Cancun airport in smuggling and money
2019
laundering

2002

Arrested after
4 days from his
arrival

Unclear:
probably 2004

Year of arrival in
the Mayan
Accusation – related
Riviera
crime
Cancún
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at request of Israeli
police.
Cancún
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government
Cancún
Arrested by Mexican
authorities through
INTERPOL at request of
Argentinian authorities
Cancún
Arrested by Mexican
authorities at the request of
US Government. INTERPOL
Red Notice
Playa del Carmen
Arrested by Mexican
authorities in an anti-narcotics
operation

Arrest Location
Arrest Authority

(Por Esto!,2019b)

(Bolan, 2019)

(Barajas, 2019)

(Por Esto!, 2019a)

(El Dictamen, 2019)

Reference

Case of the
Mayan Riviera

73

Table A1.

